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This paper analyses Malaysia’s English language policies, especially since the mid
1990s, in the light of more recent claims for a united Malaysian nation (under the
banner of bangsaMalaysia) and in the context of English language and its potential for
Malaysia to forge more of an externalised identity. It examines the impact of post-
independencemeasures to boost the status ofMalay by switching the languagemedium
in schools toMalay (BahasaMalaysia). Thishadan immediate effect onEnglishmedium
schools, but the samemeasurewas not carried through toChinese or Tamil schools. For
the latter, students nonetheless had to demonstrate competence in Bahasa Malaysia
and so there evolved an effective bilingualism for non-Malays – a bilingualism that
was not generally available for the bulk of Malay students. By the 1990s, Malaysia
sought to reintroduce English language competence via its schools and tertiary educa-
tion. This measure is part of an overall effort to engage with the globalising world.
Keywords: English language, Malaysia, globalisation
Introduction
Malaysia’s more recent post-World-War-II history of nation-building is
replete with moves to balance the demands for indigenous and Malay rights with
those of other groups that make up what now-retired Prime Minister Dr
Mahathir increasingly called Bangsa Malaysia. Of course, bangsa (‘race, nation’) as
a term is not new in Malaysian political rhetoric, but was recrafted in the latter
years of what Khoo (1995) calls ‘Mahathirism’ to be highly inclusive and not
suggestive of the 1960s–70s era when bangsa had to be automatically linked to a
single ethnic group that made up Malaysia – e.g. bangsa cina, bangsa melayu, etc.
And even in the early 1957–63 era of nation-building, Cheah (2002: 49–51) argues
that while Malay dominance was never stated openly, it was nonetheless
assumed and inevitably led to early demands for clearer spin-offs, e.g. pleas that
Malay be made the national language – but even this was not formally enshrined
until the 1967 National Language Act.
Brief Overview of Earlier Language Policy in Malaysia
Language policy during the early years of independence (1957–67) was clearly
focused on Malay identity and status and therefore placed the competing status
of English and Malay on the agenda very quickly, a period that Pennycook (1994:
195) describes as ‘the struggle for ascendancy of Malay politics, language and
culture’. This was in sharp contrast to the more laissez-faire approach to language
policy during the early colonial era, in which it was not until 1920 that the British
administration sought to exert more control over Chinese schools and required
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them to register and have their teachers vetted for political suitability. This was
very much a response to events in China. With regard to other schools, over the
last years of the 19th century and into the early 20th century, a number of small
English-medium schools were opened. Malay-medium schools also opened, and
while Gaudart (1992: 73–4) describes British policy towards such schools as more
confused than vindictive, it often meant that such schools had what was seen as
substandard education, more in tune with emphasising skills such as gardening
and cooking. Tamil-medium schools fared little better, since they were seen as
supplying labour for rubber plantations. But the critical feature in this era was
that there was increasing government support for mission schools and their
teaching of English.
One other critical factor in the school scenario during this pre-independence
phase was that the English-medium schools, besides being better supported,
were usually located in major urban centres – the result of colonial policies not
allowing the intrusion of mission or government English-medium schools into
what were seen as traditional Muslim areas in rural Malaya. In time these more
urban English-medium schools acted as a critical cog in boosting the value of
bilingualism, a bilingualism that was ‘English-and’, with the second language
being Chinese or Malay for the most part.
In the post-World-War-II era, as pressures increased for Malay nationalism,
there was increasing dissatisfaction with Malay education, and there was also
increasing suspicion of Chinese-medium schools in the shadow of Mao’s China.
Following a series of reports (see Federation of Malaya, 1951a, 1951b, 1956), the
1957 Education Ordinance sought to encourage the use of Malay with a
carrot-and-stick approach that included measures such as demanding that all
government appointees must have competence in the national language, Malay,
and that entrance to government secondary schools also depended on compe-
tence in Malay. But such an approach was bound to lead to bilingualism for
non-Malays, but more likely monolingualism for Malays – a factor that provoked
much comment and demand for change in the 1990s when competence in
English was back on the language-policy table. Given the other ethnic pressures
that faced early Malaysia, it is no surprise that there was in reality a gradualist
policy on language matters, including the national language. Of course, as Tan
(2005: 49) notes, it is also worth keeping in mind that often schools, in an individ-
ual sense, have been operating largely through one language medium – hence
the references to Malay-, Chinese- or Tamil-medium schools. The one real excep-
tion to this was the transitional period of the 1970s when English-medium
schools were being phased out. This phasing out was one clear measure to
improve the status of the national language and to counteract the drift to
English-medium schools: over the period 1956–64, the proportion who chose
English-medium schools in the government subsidised sector increased from
61% to 84.4% (see Ridge, 1996: 72).
This more gradualist approach has been a consistent part of language policy in
Malaysia and signals something of the delicate fabric with all its ethnic and
regional variations that underpinned the base of early Malaysia. The claim to
gradualism is based on factors such as the 1967 National Language Act setting a
period through to the 1980s for the fuller implementation of Bahasa as the key
medium for schools (except Chinese and Tamil ones) and for state-backed
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tertiary institutions. But by the 1990s some of the previous ethnic divisions were
not so obvious in school-enrolment patterns. In April 1995, 35,000 Malay and
Indian students were studying in Chinese-medium schools, a 2000 increase over
just one year, and the Education Ministry also reported that, of these, 25,000 were
Malays, the rest being Indians. Only a decade earlier, a little fewer than 8000
non-Chinese attended Chinese schools (Bernama News, 7 April 1995). By 1999, the
numbers of Malays in Chinese-medium schools had jumped to 40,000 (Star, 4
September 1999). The reasons behind this shift were a mixture of parents placing
children in schools with what they saw as better results, and also because among
some urban Malays there was a growing recognition of the value of Chinese as a
language of wider communication. With regard to any demand for English-
medium, by 2002 there were also reports of some 7000 Chinese Malaysians
attending English-medium schools in Singapore (Tan, 2005: 58).
Given the general shifts away from a heavy ethnic divide in Malaysia, coupled
with a booming economy at least until the mid-1990s, the overall scene for any
shift in Malaysian policy on English was quite different from that faced in the
1960s. By the mid-1990s, the government was gradually urging tertiary institu-
tions to offer technical areas in English, i.e. it gave the legal green light to institu-
tions to seek official approval for this use of English medium. At the same time,
senior government ministers and then Prime Minister Dr Mahathir made
repeated public statements urging such use of English while assuring hearers
that none of this was meant to threaten the status of the national language. By
early 2003, the government had also introduced the teaching of science and
maths in junior primary and secondary classes via English medium. Besides
these clear school-based measures, there are also measures to create technologi-
cally-literate and English-competent graduates. And in late June 2003, MCA
Vice-President and Minister for Human Resources, Dr Fong Chan Onn, in the
process of announcing RM5000 annual loans for local unemployed graduates to
upgrade skills, also highlighted how ministry studies had shown that a poor
command of English was behind the failure of many local graduates to gain
employment in the private sector (Star, 29 June 2003). In the final analysis it can
be seen that so much of what has happened to language policy in Malaysia has
been and is still entwined with the ongoing moves towards newer versions of
nationhood, especially in the more fluid environment of the 21st century world –
a world often quickly summarised as more globalising and globalised.
The Focus of this Analysis
This paper will therefore reanalyse Malaysia’s off-again-on-again affair with
the English language from two basic perspectives:
• Malaysian 21st century moves towards Bangsa Malaysia and Malaysian
nationhood in the context of globalisation; and
• English as the dominant language of science and technology and its role as
a world language.
This article, then, will assess Malaysia’s English-language policies, especially
since the mid 1990s, using these two foci and then argue that in the current
climate of a burgeoning externalisation of Malaysia’s self-image and its polit-
ico-economic future Malaysia is perhaps more in control of its own destiny.
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Rather than leaving the globalising world ‘out there’, Malaysia is attempting to
grapple with it and also to assert, mould and craft a role in the ongoing 21st
century version of globalisation. It will also attempt to pinpoint some pressure
points for Malaysia’s English language policy in the medium term.
Moves Towards Bangsa Malaysia and Malaysian Nationhood
In this section, the emphasis will be on how far Malaysia’s more recently
asserted moves towards Bangsa Malaysia interact with the newer measures from
the mid-1990s to boost English-language competence via the educational
systems. This will be argued as reflecting a shift from the immediate post-
independence years of a focus on solidifying and enhancing Malay rights and
identity to a more recent emphasis on the advancement of a Malaysian identity
and well-being via a more externalised economy – something very much at the
heart of Vision 2020.1 In turn, much of this process was for a time still in some
flux, especially following the 1999 elections.
Post Cold-War context
Malaysia’s version of nationhood, now being recrafted in a very distinct
post-Cold-War world, has been epitomised by a relatively long-term process of
nation-building. But over the past 20 years this was heavily influenced by former
Prime Minister Mahathir’s policies. Verma (2002: 42) describes these policies as
being meant ‘to encourage the perception of the Malaysian state as a modern
state – a protective agency that will make all communities equally prosperous –
yet also to be cautious that centralisation does not lead to disruption of commu-
nal authority structures’. In many ways, the 1999 elections placed quite different
pressures on this overall policy framework and Maznah Mohamad (2003: 68–9)
has argued that what is seen as a monopoly by UMNO (United Malays National
Organisation, the major partner in the governing coalition) over ‘Malay consen-
sus’ was shaken, especially once what started out as criticism directed at Dr
Mahathir over the sacking and jailing of the former Deputy Prime Minister
Anwar Ibrahim turned into wider criticism of UMNO, all linked with concern
over other areas of discontent, e.g. social and political reform. However, despite
the tensions that underlay the Anwar factor, and in a manner that also seems to
suggest a more unified Malaysian consciousness, Maznah Mohamad (2003:
77–8) also argued that the coalition2 government was ‘guaranteed victory as long
as UMNO continues to contest and win in mixed seats’. On top of this, there was a
growing awareness that urban Malay voters, while not enamoured with UMNO
per se, were also showing signs of an active identity beyond the ethnic one, and
one that Mandal (2001: 157) has described as being not so concerned with
ethnicism and as a result as not being primarily focused on matters exclusively
Malay. Mandal (2001: 160) also noted that, with shifts in the 1990s towards a
growing economic liberalisation, there has also been an observable increase in
the use of English in public places, all of which feeds into Mandal’s perhaps still
overly ambitious claim that English is the pre-eminent language of all Malay-
sians, i.e. it is no longer the case that English language is seen as being the
preserve of any one ethnic group – or highly marked bangsa – in Malaysia.
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But not all the lead-up to the 1999 elections was explicitly about English-
language policy. In the context of Chinese politics, Ng (2003: 98–9) noted that
even during the lead-up to the 1999 elections, when there was some uncertainty
over the Chinese vote for the coalition, there were clearer moves to provide some
benefits for such voters, particularly in the educational field. Ng detailed how, in
some pre-election material, much was made of how the coalition was able to back
further expansion of private higher education colleges, many of which are the
lifeline for continuing educational opportunities for Chinese Malaysians.
Indeed, Ng (2003: 102) remarked that many found the coalition’s ‘generosity’
towards Chinese education quite out of the ordinary. This was because the
proposed measures were to cover a range of Chinese education issues including
recognition of Chinese independent secondary schools for the first time, estab-
lishing Chinese primary schools, etc. However, such political compromise and
manoeuvring was all part of the ongoing political ground that still underpins
English language policy, and this feature seems best to reflect what Ng (2003:
91–2) argued is a 1990s’ tendency for Chinese voters to move to the political
centre such that integration is a more marked feature of Chinese Malaysians
today. This is a clear shift from the dark days after May 1969 remembered more
for a sharp move to the political outer by Chinese Malaysians and it is also a prob-
able indicator of a wider Bangsa Malaysia mentality.
1999 elections and Bangsa Malaysia
Linked to all these pathways along the track to Malaysian nationhood is the
issue of language policy (with a special focus on the status of the national
language vis-à-vis English) and access to educational opportunities, both in quite
individual and community terms, and also in national terms, particularly in the
era of Vision 2020. Cheah (2002: 240) nonetheless claimed that Dr Mahathir in his
announcement of Vision 2020 clearly asserted that this vision was meant to
accommodate non-Malays ‘as co-partners with Malays in the task of transform-
ing Malaysia into a modern, highly-developed, “just and equal” Bangsa Malaysia,
or Malaysian nation’. While it may well have been true that more non-Malays
than Malays welcomed this, there have also been ongoing pleas from some
Malay leaders that the government not take away ‘special privileges’ for Malays.
If this situation persists, then Bangsa Malaysia may be delayed or will develop its
own unique Malaysian qualities, especially among younger Malaysians.
The results of the 1999 elections were a clear rebuff for UMNO by urban-based
Malay voters, but nonetheless, the national coalition did clearly win convinc-
ingly. However, events such as 11 September 2001, Bali October 2002 and the Iraq
War of early 2003 have also placed great strains on more Islamic-based group-
ings in Malaysia, and this in turn has in some way affected the ongoing evolution
of Malaysia and its coalition government by providing at least a more stable
political ground for ongoing English-language policy. In the pre-2004 national
election climate, the clear opposition that might have been expected from some
of the more Islamic political groupings was necessarily muted: the political
ground was not so fertile for such groupings, leaving a policy breathing space for
the government in which it could continue to pursue its various policies, espe-
cially the gradual reintroduction of English language competence via the educa-
tional systems.
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One other key indicator of a shift in how younger Malaysians see themselves
is evident in the results of a survey of younger Malaysians studying overseas.
Heng Pek Koon, a Malaysian academic based in the US, was reported (Straits
Times, 8 August 2003) as finding in a 1999–2000 survey of 501 college students
(this period straddled the 1999 election) that non-Malays were not overly
concerned about any pro-Malay bias of the New Economic Policy (NEP). Inter-
estingly, it was Malay students who, if they were more concerned by the NEP
(most were not), expressed opposition to what they saw as the NEP’s role in
widening the gap between the haves and have-nots among the Malay popula-
tion. And in the wider political domain there looks to be change afoot, with only
34% of these same younger-generation Malays ranking the then Prime Minister
Dr Mahathir as the politician they admired most – with the former Deputy Prime
Minister Anwar Ibrahim coming in with only a 35 % approval rating.
These results contrast sharply with the 60% of the younger Chinese respon-
dents rating Dr Mahathir as the top ranked politician, and this was outstripped
by a 70% approval rating among the younger Indian respondents. Perhaps more
interestingly, these same younger Malaysians pinpointed factors such as any
growing Islamisation of Malays, disaffection with what they saw as UMNO’s
money politics, and perceived corruption as being the key to the general erosion
of Malay support for UMNO. But the picture was still not entirely clear-cut as far
as Bangsa Malaysia was concerned: 62% of surveyed Malay respondents saw
Islam and the Malay language as the most important characteristics of a common
Malaysian identity. Yet, at the same time, 70% of all respondents claimed that
Bangsa Malaysia was more important to them than their own particular ethnic
identities. It is this still fairly fluid socio-political sea that surrounds ongoing
English-language policy and no doubt will also be affected by any future
improvement or worsening of the overall economic health of Malaysia and the
region generally. Verma (2002: 82) also issues a reminder that, while in the past
policies that worked through affirmative action for Malays operated in a context
of fixed identities, such rigidity might not be operative for ever, especially as it
appears that identity is subject to reinvention and renegotiation. Bangsa Malaysia
may well have a high salience in the Malaysia of the early 21st century and
beyond. Such a shift can be linked with Dr Mahathir’s general policy objective of
having Malaysia act as a modern state, but one which can interact with
globalisation, a globalisation which the Prime Minister also consistently attacked
because of what he saw as the negative impact of free flows of finance. Such
prime ministerial ‘contrariness’ of that time could be seen as also working to
create the former Prime Minister’s modern Malaysian state. And it is worth
remembering that it was Dr Mahathir in the post-1999 election era who told his
governing coalition partners that their multi-ethnic alliance would become a
single party one day (Cheah, 2002: 187). This was a far cry from the Malay
Dilemma.3
Malaysia – Possible dilemma over Bangsa dan Ugama?
Nonetheless, given the newer elements of the evolving external political envi-
ronment where globalisation following the collapse of the former superpower
rivalry between the US and USSR is now also adjusting to an Islamic revival,
there is another term in the Malaysian political rhetoric that seems to be taking on
412 Current Issues in Language Planning
CIP065
C:\edrive\cilp\2005d\cilp2005d.vp
Thursday, November 17, 2005 13:02:43
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
a new significance: ugama, ‘religion’ This term is usually bracketed with bangsa in
many Bahasa texts as bangsa dan ugama and in many ways seems quite capable of
projecting something of a dilemma. While bangsa may be taking on more of an
inclusive connotation in the late 20th century–early 21st century, ugama, while
still obviously closely linked with religion, is closely associated with not just any
religion. In what appears to be an unmarked usage, the linkage is more towards
Islam than any other in the distinctly Malaysian context. It seems not to be imme-
diately linked at this stage with a more diffuse reference to religion generally in
the Malaysian context as it seems to trigger connections with some key terms in
the national constitution where reference is also made to Islam as the religion of
at least Malays, particularly given that the Malaysian constitution defines a
Malay as ‘a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the
Malay language, conforms to Malay custom’ (Article 160).4 In this special contex-
tual field, ethnicity and religion – Islam – are fused. But, if it is the case that this
factor swings the whole connotative field more towards Islam, then it is still
possible that bangsa dan ugama may run the risk of reducing the assumed
inclusivity of bangsa, especially as ugama in the phrase bangsa dan ugama has no
real distinctive non-Islamic semantic field for non-Malays. This possible deflec-
tion may also be more operative in the current explosive international context, so
much of which is inclined to centre on Islam in very general, and perhaps force-
fully stereotypical, ways. This newer focus in the external, globalising world on
Islam in such general ways is itself another facet of globalisation.5 But in the
evolving Malaysian context, the linking of bangsa with ugama also seems to have
the capacity perhaps to shift the perceptual field of bangsa away from the more
inclusive to a more exclusive reference. Again, the interaction of both internal
and external factors is of ongoing interest in any analysis of Malaysia, its more
recent English language policies, and globalisation.
English as a World Language
Pluricentrism
A critical backdrop to this ever-dynamic Malaysian scenario is the shift in the
status and use of English on the world stage. In particular, how does English feed
into and feed burgeoning communication technologies? Consequently, of
special interest here is how this more insistent factor of English as a language of
wider communication is interacting with Malaysia’s more recent policy shifts for
overtly increasing roles for English language in Malaysia of the 21st century. One
natural consequence of the ever-expanding roles for English worldwide is that
increasingly it has various ‘centres’ and therefore no longer can be seen solely as
epitomising older versions of an English or even American colonialism or domi-
nance. This aspect runs in tandem with an increasing appreciation of the
pluricentric characteristics of languages of wider communication such as
English. Pluricentrism (see Clyne, 1992: 1 and 1997) refers to how such languages
have different interacting centres, each usually providing a national variety with
some of its own distinctive, and often codified, norms. This process has occurred
with many Englishes in the world, and more recently there is now an ongoing
dictionary project for Singapore English. In the Australian context, much similar
work occurred leading up to the 1988 Bicentenary of British settlement.
Bangsa Malaysia and Recent Malaysian English Language Policies 413
CIP065
C:\edrive\cilp\2005d\cilp2005d.vp
Thursday, November 17, 2005 13:02:44
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
In such cases of pluricentrism, there is usually a more overt appreciation of a
cultural ‘weight’ for the then accepted and codified form of the language in the
community at large. This means that there is less of a looking towards an external
norm for acceptable usage. Of course, while English has been on the ground in
Malaysia for a longish period, it is not yet true that there is currently an accepted
norm with all its associated cultural factors, but it is not beyond the imagination
to see this occurring, as it has for the various forms of Malay – see the clear
national demarcations, yet still clearly operating associations, between Malay-
sia’s Bahasa Melayu/Bahasa Malaysia,6 Indonesia’s Bahasa Indonesia, and Brunei’s
Bahasa Melayu. As Asmah Haji Omar (1992: 419) notes, Malay is not a
monocentric language and never has been, and these more recent labellings are
indicative of a quite active pluricentrism and of varying histories of nation-
building.
Growth of English worldwide
In a more historical perspective of Malaysia’s view on its future, it is worth
noting that if the immediate post-colonial measures to build status and wider
competence in the national language had not been successful, then none of the
current moves to revive English language competence could have happened:
there would not have been sufficient support on the ground such that the
UMNO-led coalition could steadily push for quite marked shifts in required
standards of English via the educational system. Another aspect is that, in the
wider linguistic sphere, English has become a very widespread and superfi-
cially powerful language – that is, more and more speakers use it, often as a key
second language rather than as a first language, and it also operates as the infor-
mation pathway in technology, economics, etc. As Kaplan (2001: 9–10) notes, as
the British Empire contracted, the spread of English-language teaching
increased. This was very much the result of the new post-World-War-II politi-
cal engine behind English, namely the US, and other technological factors like
the first computer programs (Basic, FORTRAN) being associated with a very
English-like language/code and output. A key additional factor in this US
connection was the fact that in this post-World-War-II era, the US had an estab-
lished, viable, operating educational and scientific sector that naturally attracted
others to it for education and training. Other possible contenders were generally
too busy re-constructing during the post-war years, e.g. Germany. The Cold War
also dampened Russia’s chances of being the technological communicator – this
was as much owing to Soviet reluctance to share technological advances as it was
to non-Soviet avoidance of the major foe. In more general regional terms, Baldauf
and Djité (2003: 220–21) remark that for South-east Asia the continued interpola-
tion of English in music, advertising and film subtitling tends to provide a wider
exposure to English, and this will complement what they see as a strengthening
of English-speaker numbers for largely pragmatic reasons. In the Malaysian
context, English never disappeared entirely, even after the dark days the race
riots of May 1969, and there has been some notable literary output in English too
(e.g. K.S. Maniam, Ee Tiang Hong). In other words, there has been a ‘core’ that
could well provide a nurturing centre for a more Malaysian core of another vari-
ety of English.
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In a wider perspective, Crystal (2000: 12–16) sets out the demise of many
languages, often linked with a rapid increase in the use of English as a language
of wider communication. In his general discussion, Crystal (2000: 14) reflects on
the fact that while there may be around 7000 languages worldwide, in a world
population of 6 billion plus, eight languages have over 100 million speakers each
(Mandarin, Spanish, English, Bengali, Hindi, Portuguese, Russian, Japanese).
Indeed, these eight languages have over 2.4 billion speakers between them. This
yawning distortion is further captured by the fact that just 4% of the world’s
languages are spoken by 96% of the world’s population – or to put it another way:
96% of the world’s languages are spoken by just 4% of the total population, with a
quarter of the world’s languages being spoken by less than 1000 people; and
nearly 500 languages have fewer than 100 speakers. Crystal (2003: 20) summa-
rises the trends in language use (and death) as meaning that at least 50% of the
current stock of languages look to disappear within the next century.
Of course, from a longer historical perspective it is perhaps surprising that the
language of a small island should move so far so fast, all very much the result of a
tight series of almost accidents, plus various outcomes from the ongoing contests
among European imperial powers as they pushed beyond the Old World to the
New. Graddol (1999: 59) backgrounds the spread of English with the sobering
observation that while AD700 might work as a good starting point for English as a
language – after a rapid evolution from the language mix of earlier migrants from
around the 5th century – at that point, he argues that there were most likely only a
few thousand speakers of this early Old English. It was not until the 17th-century
expansion to the Americas that we note the possible increase of English speakers to
around seven million, followed later by a rapid rise in English speakers, largely in
America, to around 100 million by the end of the 19th century.
While this 100 million is a far cry from the current estimates of 300 million L1
English-speakers, plus approximately 350 million L2 speakers of English world-
wide (Graddol, 1999: 64–6), there is another useful perspective to consider. Given
the possible shifts in global politics as the new China takes up more of an interna-
tional political and economic role, what might such environmental shifts mean
for the future usage patterns of English as a world language? Are there other
contenders for being one of the predominant world languages? In time, how might
this affect Malaysia and other areas grappling with languages of wider communi-
cation? Bruthiuax (2002) presents a detailed analysis of this using a productive
array of factors: linguistic typology, including writing systems; learnability of
language types; and the critical socio-political aspect buried in what he sees as
whether a language is perceived as a vehicle for modernising values. This last
factor is itself the source of some major critiques of English as a world language in
terms of a latent, perhaps assertive, linguistic imperialism (see Phillipson, 1992,
2002; Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas, 1999).
English language: Modernising and liberating force?
Bruthiaux’s (2002) analysis has a general conclusion that, for the foreseeable
future, English has all the key characteristics that make it likely to remain the
dominant worldwide language, even if there should be a clear passing of what he
calls the American era. But perhaps what is more revealing in his lengthy discus-
sion is his section detailing how English has left behind other competitors like
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Dutch, German, Italian, Hindi, Japanese, etc., in this world of intense information
flow via information technology, plus the array of other critical features associ-
ated with English usage, e.g. the ratio of speakers to per capita GNP, English so
far has left behind other competitors like Dutch, German, Italian, Hindi, Japa-
nese, etc. (Bruthiaux, 2002: 130). And, in a longer-term perspective, he also notes
that English is growing in its supra-national reach, not only because of its
perceived information-richness, but also because as more people choose to learn
it, then with a typical knock-on effect its attraction increases in other parts of the
world (Bruthiaux, 2002: 134). But it is important to keep a watchful eye on
assumptions that mere economic and military power are the key to assessing the
relative strength of languages of wider, trans-national communication.
There are other factors, such as an appreciation of current operating critical
mass of speakers, plus the impact of how a language is perceived as being associ-
ated with new ideas, or what Bruthiaux (2002: 145) calls its appeal ‘as a modernis-
ing and liberating force’. This power is reliant not so much on whether a language
is linked to a values system per se, as on whether the language, and any associated
values, are best seen as being part and parcel of a process that could create benefi-
cial change. And the most obvious change in today’s world is that of access to a
more generalised wealth creation that is seen to benefit a wider domain in a soci-
ety. This has so far been very much at the core of Malaysian leaders’ public urgings
for greater English-language competence among Bangsa Malaysia. Indeed, it is
perhaps best seen as another important arm in creating Bangsa Malaysia.7
At the same time, given the evolving tensions from Islamic quarters on the
world scene, and from more Islamic-centred groupings in Malaysia itself, e.g.
PAS (Parti Islam seMalaysia – Islamic Party of Malaysia), then there must be an
expected clash of mindsets over preferred values systems and hence preferred
languages of wider communication and ultimately over the perceived access to
innovation and possible avenues of wealth and lifestyle that surround languages
like English. The real long-term impact of this tension is perhaps not yet crystal-
lised for the new Malaysia, much less for Bangsa Malaysia. The 1991 espousal of
Bangsa Malaysia now has to contextualise itself in a whole new set of political,
cultural and economic realities, both inside Malaysia and beyond.
Some Issues Facing Malaysia’s English-Language Policy
Despite this current love affair with English – which is not meant to displace
Bahasa – there are some possible reasons for caution. One immediate issue is
whether there will be sufficient teachers with the requisite English-language
skills to back the recent policy shift in the classroom, especially when the process
is extended to upper-level classes. Another pressure factor is that it seems possi-
ble for students in the science/maths streams to be exposed to English medium
more than other discipline streams and hence there is something of a risk that
varying competencies in both the national language and English will result –
perhaps another diglossic pattern?
English language and Malaysia’s tertiary education sector
In the tertiary sector, similar questions arise, including in the private tertiary
sector. In this private sector there are now indications that, in accordance with
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government encouragement of these private colleges having a more ethnically
mixed student body, Malay students, for example, are going to such colleges in
slowly increasing numbers. But in such cases the colleges may face initial diffi-
culties over the English-language competence of such students, and this could
well place added pressures on resources.8 Another more intriguing issue is
whether the emphasis on English-language skills, particularly to support access
to science and technology, the major engines that are seen to be crucial for the
new Bangsa Malaysia, could in time create new pressures on Bahasa and its rela-
tive status. This in so many ways harks back to early days of independence when
English-medium schools had a markedly higher status, but in the newer, more
globalised, world, languages like English have an added status factor, namely,
languages of wider communication, particularly in the realms of technology and
economic contact. But for now, as noted by Gill (2003), ‘English in Malaysia has
come full circle in its journey and has been instituted as the medium of instruc-
tion for science and technology subjects for designated levels of the school system
this year (2003) and the university system in 2005’. The policy is now in full swing,
with the Malaysian government signing multi-million-dollar, six-year contracts
with overseas universities to train teachers for teaching English as a foreign
language throughout Malaysia. Reports indicate that approximately $100
million have been earmarked for this training project, with the government set to
cover tuition and other costs for the hundreds of students who are to be trained
(Campus Review, 2 March 2005, p. 4).
More immediate access to science and technology
In the science and technology sphere, Malaysian spokespersons have repeat-
edly asserted that without instant contact and communication – via English –
Malaysia’s future development is in jeopardy. Dr Mahathir also added his typi-
cal discourse when he called on Malaysians to do their bit for nationalism by
improving their English-language competence: he saw this as one way of doing
something for the country (Star, 10 September 1999). In May 2003, Gill from
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia was quoted as urging the same more wide-
spread English-language competence:
The national language policy had been adopted in the past because it was a
natural process of the post-independence era, and if not done, would have
had major negative repercussions for the political stability of the nation . . .
However, in the present global economic climate, Malaysia’s about turn
with regard to English has become a necessity in order to compete and
survive . . . We may be left out of the international loop of science and tech-
nology . . . (Star, 20 May 2003)
According to the same report, she went on to point out that over the 39-year
period 1956–95, the Translation Section of Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (Literary
and Language Agency) had only translated and published 374 books, while
public universities had published 168 books within the same period. And to
emphasise this desperate pressure of trying to keep up with ever-exploding
knowledge, she pointed out that there are 100,000 scientific journals worldwide,
with around 5000 new articles appearing every day – and this is on top of the 30
million existing journal articles. Of course, not all of these are in English, but, as
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Ammon (2001) demonstrates, there is increasing pressure on researchers to
publish in languages of wider communication, particularly English: indeed,
contributions to this Ammon volume cite cases of researchers making conscious
decisions to publish in English rather than their first language.9
Bahasa and English: New ecology?
But this may in time present a new linguistic ecology with competing status
markers for English and Bahasa. This was very much at the heart of the immedi-
ate post-independence moves to put a hold on English while promoting largely
educational measures to enhance Bahasa. The question now is whether a new set
of status features will develop for the new Bangsa Malaysia such that Bahasa is not
readily challenged; or will there be some version of diglossia with Bahasa being
of prime concern in the community socio-political discourse environment and
English being more a marker of external, scientific-technological discourse? In a
recent study of the Philippines situation, Gonzalez (2002) makes special note of
how the national language, Tagalog, has moved through phases of basic stand-
ardisation, to what he calls a phase of cultivation where it is used increasingly in
literature, education, the media, etc. and to a phase of intellectualisation where it
is used as the medium of academic discourse. This last phase usually has high
costs associated with it and, in the Malaysian context, some of these are alluded to
by the reference to Gill above. Sometimes such costs are seen as being too high, but
these inevitably are balanced by the cost of loss of symbolic status for a local
language. Medgyes and Kaplan (1992) have argued very forcefully that academic
communication in an indigenous language may lead to effective isolation of the
discipline and its practitioners – a fate not often favoured by academics!
This very phase of intellectualisation has been at the root of some of the Malay-
sian dissent over more recent English-language policy initiatives to teach
lower-primary and secondary maths and sciences via English medium – recall
how UMNO youth initially opposed them (Star, 9 May 2002) – and it is also some-
times mixed with religious undertones. Some of this flared during the 1999 elec-
tions, although, as Case (2001: 50) notes, while some of the opposition groups did
not do as well they had hoped in the 1999 elections, the more Islamicist party,
PAS, did increase its seats from 8 to 27. As a result of what appeared to be a rela-
tively fluid situation in the post-1999 elections, for Malaysia, it was also still a
very open question as to what will eventually pan out sociolinguistically for the
newer Malaysia.
However, the March 2004 national elections did solidify the long-term Malay-
sian government strategies for English language as the PAS opposition effec-
tively collapsed and the UMNO-led coalition, with the new prime minister,
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, was returned with a solid majority. Dr Mahathir had
retired as prime minister in October 2004 and the new prime minister wasted
little time in cementing his own political mandate. The national government was
returned with 90% of the seats in the national parliament – up from the 77% it
held after the 1999 elections. The PAS opposition hold in parliament dropped to
seven seats – down from the 27 seats it held post-1999 (The Economist, 27 March
2004, p. 30). Thus, while there may well be a keener focus on Islamist matters in
the world more generally, the Malaysian focus via PAS is now a quite different
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entity. Just how all this interacts with globalisation generally is still a live issue in
Malaysia.
The same is true for many other national bodies politic in the 21st century’s
version of globalisation. Globalisation itself may not be new, but its guise is, and
this in turn may have an impact in quite different ways on the relative status and
use of languages in the future. Part of the new guise is the extra layer of focus on
what Scholte (2000: Ch. 1) argues is supra-territoriality rather than on sover-
eignty and territoriality alone. According to Scholte (2000: 19), globalisation may
have had a long history, but it is still far from an entirely clear concept. It is also
clear that so much of the new version of globalisation has been generated by a
combination of ever-growing communication technologies that have fed into
newer developments in technology transfers, into financial markets’ ability to
operate beyond physical space, plus interconnectivity that has created greater
operating capacities for trans-national operations in the political sphere. All of
this is also working to create greater awareness of world events, and of a wider
ability to participate in world events. Scholte (2000: 95) summarises much of this
by reminding us that rationalist thinking ‘has encouraged the growth of a global
imagination and the various material supra-territorial activities (communica-
tions, markets, etc.) that global thinking promotes’. Malaysia, with its clearer
intent towards external engagement in all these spheres, including as they do the
political, strategic, educational, technological and financial, will remain a very
important exemplar of what the various futures may hold more generally
around the world. It will also provide a lucrative testing ground for competing
theoretical frames of what globalisation might ideally mean – and this is of
special importance in terms of its ongoing English-language policy.
Conclusion
Overall, Malaysia in the early 21st century now has a more complex array of
factors feeding into its own creation of Bangsa Malaysia. These range from the
newer version of globalisation, which is largely based on information, informa-
tion technology and rapid transfer of information, to an almost parallel series of
pressures that are shaping languages of wider communication, of which English
is one, but which has so far had the added feature of being the critical language of
the newer technologies and information transfer. It is a moot point whether this
will remain, but, as Bruthiaux (2002) argues, there is also the factor of ‘cultural
import’ that seems to link English with a different kind of status. Nonetheless, it
is also apparent that such languages of wider communication, while being seen
as ‘worldly’, are also subject to social forces that mean that, rather than being
monolithic wholes, they are developing a diverse range of centres or more local-
ised standards or preferred forms – this refers to the core of a pluricentrism when
applied to language use. All of these factors allow us to see the people factors at
work. Languages are not mere vehicles of communication. They are also often
closely linked to how people create and project themselves and their identity. In
this scenario it makes little sense to view languages as ‘killers’ of people and their
identity. In the Malaysian case, there is once more an inevitable sorting-out of the
roles and relationship between English and Bahasa, all in the oft-quoted frame of
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progress, a frame that Dr Mahathir claimed demanded a change in Malaysia’s
English policy when he said:
. . . we need to do it. It is the government’s opinion that once we have
become a successful race, our language by itself will gain the respect of
others. On the other hand, a race, which is not successful, will not be able to
gain the respect for its language even though they hold it strongly. (New
Straits Times, 28 December 1993)
However, since the early days of independence, Malaysia has moved along a
long political path, dominated by the National Front government, but now the
nature of that coalition is changing once more as Malaysia tackles the 21st
century. There is evidence of a greater appreciation of a Malaysian identity,
particularly among younger Malaysians, and so it can be argued that this evolv-
ing Bangsa Malaysia is well beyond the conceptual frames of the early post-
colonial political environment, an environment that Scholte (2000) would see as
being centred on territoriality. In fact, this newer frame is making the term
post-colonial largely irrelevant, or at best, an historical term with little relevance
for today’s Malaysia. From a linguistic perspective, the choices currently faced
by Malaysian language-policy-makers are not usefully linked to the older ethnic
divides that bedevilled Malaysian politics in its early days of independence: it
looks far more likely that this 21st-century linguistic evolution of a newer
language ecology will be an inextricable part of and run hand in hand with future
steps towards Bangsa Malaysia – a bangsa that is more centred on Scholte’s (2000)
supra-territoriality. Nonetheless, given the external global factors in the post-11
September 2001 world, and the possible religio-ethnic links forged by the many
concurrent references to ugama, even the bangsa of Bangsa Malaysia may no longer
be quite what was envisaged a little over a decade ago when Vision 2020 was
initially crafted, although that too has no doubt been recrafted in the light of the
2004 elections.
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Notes
1. Vision 2020 was a paper delivered by Dr Mahathir in February 1991 to the Malaysian
Business Council, outlining his thoughts on the future course of the nation and how it
should go about to attaining the objective of developing Malaysia into an industrial-
ised country. In its early promotion it was interacting with a quite different external
environment and hence it is not difficult to sense its inherent optimism. Witness Dr
Mahathir’s remarks when he outlined his Vision 2020:
There can be no fully developed Malaysia until we have finally overcome the
nine central strategic challenges that have confronted us from the moment of our
birth as an independent nation. The first of these is the challenge of establishing a
united Malaysian nation with a sense of common and shared destiny . . . (my italics)
(Cheah, 2002: 185).
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2. The governing coalition comprises UMNO (United Malays National Organisation),
and other partners such as the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malay-
sian Indian Congress (MIC).
3. In June 2002 at the UMNO Annual Assembly Dr Mahathir expressed his sorrow at not
having really raised the status of Malays. He also went on record as bemoaning the
fact that Malay students did not want to work or study: ‘They are not willing to do
anything hard’. ( Sydney Morning Herald, 22–23 June 2002.) He has also criticised Malay
students for not taking up more technical areas of study at tertiary level.
4. This phrasing reflects so much of the terminology outlined in the 1947 Federation of
Malaya Report of the Working Committee Appointed by a Conference of His Excellency the
Governor of the Malayan Union, Their Highnesses the Rulers of the Malay States, and the
Representatives of the United Malays National Organisation, cited in Ganguly (2003: 243).
5. But even this more externalising link with globalisation also has its internal echoes
with the major opposition party, PAS. PAS has a clear Islamic agenda which it has to
manage vis-à-vis the external issues. And internally, in mid-November 2003, PAS
finally took up the challenge of spelling out in its Islamic State Document what it saw as
its role to institute a truly Islamic state if it ever came to power. This same climate will
most likely have associative links with ugama too. This followed repeated calls by
now-retired Prime Minister Dr Mahathir for PAS to set out how it proposed to estab-
lish its Islamic state. Naturally, not all Malaysians are positive, although UMNO still
recognised that it had much catch-up work to do to win back some of its voters who
opted for PAS during the 1999 elections. By the same token, this PAS proposal also
forced non-Malays to rethink voting against the UMNO coalition government in elec-
tions due in 2004. One senior UMNO official, Azim Zabadi, also noted that some
people may have lost enthusiasm for some of the older leaders, ‘but Malays haven’t
completely deserted us, and to get them back UMNO must be rejuvenated . . . ’ (Far
Eastern Economic Review, 27 November 2003, p. 24).
6. There have been shifts in the term used for the national language in Malaysia. Early
on, there were references to Bahasa Melayu, then to Bahasa Nasional in the heady
days of early independence in the 1960s, then to Bahasa Malaysia during the
1970s–1990s, and more recently, the term Bahasa Melayu is increasingly used.
7. Interestingly, in press publicity for workshops for Malaysia’s English teachers in
April 2003 (Star, 13 April 2003) there were numerous references to how English could
work with the national language in nation building.
8. Of course, it is also worth noting that some of these private colleges now have univer-
sity status and this adds a more diverse shape to Malaysia’s ongoing development of
its educational base.
9. Gunnarsson (2001: 287–316), for example, notes that while English is increasingly
preferred in higher degree programmes in Swedish universities and is reported as the
preferred language of scientific publication by increasing numbers of Swedish
researchers, she also queries whether in time there will be a functional diglossia
within the Swedish-speaking community.
References
Ammon, U. (ed.) (2001) The Dominance of English as a Language of Science. Berlin/New York:
Mouton de Gruyter.
Asmah Haji Omar (1992) Malay as a pluricentric language. In M. Clyne (ed.) Pluricentric
Languages: Differing Norms in Different Nations (pp. 401–19). Berlin/New York: Mouton
de Gruyter.
Baldauf, R.B. and Djité, P.G. (2003) Australasia and the South Pacific. In J. Maurais and
M.A. Morris (eds) Languages in a Globalising World (pp. 217–27). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Bruthiaux, P. (2002) Predicting challenges to English as a global language in the 21st
century. Language Problems and Language Planning 26 (2), 129–57.
Case, W. (2001) Malaysia’s general elections in 1999: A consolidated and high-quality
semi-democracy. Asian Studies Review 25 (1), 35–55.
Bangsa Malaysia and Recent Malaysian English Language Policies 421
CIP065
C:\edrive\cilp\2005d\cilp2005d.vp
Thursday, November 17, 2005 13:02:46
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Cheah, B.K. (2002) Malaysia: The Making of a Nation. History of Nation-Building Series.
Singapore: ISEAS.
Clyne, M. (ed.) (1992) Pluricentric Languages. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Clyne, M. (1997) Pluricentric languages and national identity: An antipodean view. In
E.W. Schneider (ed.) Englishes Around the World (vol. 2) (pp. 287–300). Amsterdam/
Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Crystal, D. (2000) Language Death. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crystal, D. (2003) English as a Global Language (2nd edn). Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Federation of Malaya (1951a) (June) Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malayans:
Report of a Mission Invited by the Federation Government to Study the Problems of the Chinese
in Malaya (Fenn-Wu Report). Kuala Lumpur.
Federation of Malaya (1951b) Report of the Committee on Malay Education (Barnes Report).
Kuala Lumpur.
Federation of Malaya (1956) Report of the Education Review Committee (Razak Report).
Federation of Malaya Legislative Council No 20.
Ganguly, S. (2003) The politics of language policies in Malaysia and Singapore. In M.
Brown and S. Ganguly (eds) Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia
(pp. 239–61). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gaudart, H. (1992) Bilingual Education in Malaysia. Townsville, Australia: Centre for
South-East Asian Studies, James Cook University.
Gill, S.K. (2003) Language ecology and policy – balancing development and sustaining
identities. Paper presented at the Language and Nationhood: Confronting New Realities
Conference, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, December.
Gonzalez, A. (2002) Language planning and intellectualisation. Current Issues in Language
Planning 3 (1), 5–27.
Graddol, D. (1999) The decline of the native speaker. In D. Graddol and U. Meinhof (eds)
English in a Changing World. AILA Review 13, 557–68.
Gunnarsson, B-L. (2001) Swedish, English, French or German – the language situation in
Swedish universities. In U. Ammon (ed.) The Dominance of English as a Language of
Science (pp. 287–316). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Kaplan, R. (2001) English – the accidental language of science? In U. Ammon (ed.) The
Dominance of English as a Language of Science (pp. 3–26). Berlin/New York: Mouton de
Gruyter.
Khoo Bee Teik (1995) Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir
Mohamad. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
Mandal, K. (2001) Boundaries and beyond: Whither the cultural bases of political community
in Malaysia? In R.W. Hefner (ed.) The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship
in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia (pp. 183–203). Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Maznah Mohamad (2003) The contest for Malay votes in 1999: UMNO’s most recent
historic challenge? In F.K.W. Loh and J. Saravanamuttu (eds) New Politics in Malaysia
(pp. 66–86). Singapore: ISEAS.
Medgyes, P. and Kaplan R. (1992) Discourse in a foreign language: The example of
Hungarian scholars. International Journal of the Sociology of Language 98, 67–100.
Ng Tien Eng (2003) The contest for Chinese votes: Politics of negotiation or politics of
pressure? In F.K.W. Loh and J. Saravanamuttu (eds) New Politics in Malaysia (pp.
87–106). Singapore: ISEAS.
Pennycook, A. (1994) The Cultural Politics of English as an International Language. London:
Longman.
Phillipson, R. (1992) Linguistic Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Phillipson, R. (2002) Global English and local language policies. Language Problems and
Language Planning 25 (1), 1–24.
Phillipson, W. and Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (1999) Englishisation: One dimension of
globalisation. In D. Graddol and U. Meinhof (eds) English in a Changing World. AILA
Review 13, 19–36. Oxford: English Book Centre.
Ridge, B. (1996) English language and Malaysia identity: A shifting odyssey. Asian Studies
Review 19 (3), 67–78.
422 Current Issues in Language Planning
CIP065
C:\edrive\cilp\2005d\cilp2005d.vp
Thursday, November 17, 2005 13:02:46
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Scholte, J.A. (2000) Globalization: A Critical Introduction. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tan, P.K.W. (2005) The medium-of-instruction debate in Malaysia. Language Problems and
Language Planning 29 (1), 47–66.
Verma, V. (2002) Malaysia: State and Civil Society in Transition. Boulder, CO & London:
Lynne Rienner.
Bangsa Malaysia and Recent Malaysian English Language Policies 423
CIP065
C:\edrive\cilp\2005d\cilp2005d.vp
Thursday, November 17, 2005 13:02:46
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen

